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A RULE FOR UPDATING AMBIGUOUS BELIEFS
ABSTRACT. When preferences are such that there is no unique additive prior, the
issue of which updating rule to use is of extreme importance. This paper presents
an axiomatization of the rule which requires updating of all the priors by Bayes
rule. The decision maker has conditional preferences over acts. It is assumed that
preferences over acts conditional on eventE happening, do not depend on lotteries
received on Ec, obey axioms which lead to maxmin expected utility representa-
tion with multiple priors, and have common induced preferences over lotteries.
The paper shows that when all priors give positive probability to an event E, a
certain coherence property between conditional and unconditional preferences is
satisfied if and only if the set of subjective probability measures considered by the
agent given E is obtained by updating all subjective prior probability measures
using Bayes rule.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Savage (1954) model of decision making under uncertainty
prescribes that a decision maker has a unique prior probability and
a utility function such that decisions are made so as to maximize
the expected utility. However, there exists a large body of empir-
ical evidence which contradicts Savage’s subjective expected utility
model (see Camerer and Weber, 1992). In particular, behavior such
as that exhibited in the Ellsberg Paradox (1961) is inconsistent with
that approach. The main problem is that the ambiguity that is com-
mon in situations of uncertainty cannot be captured in the repres-
entation of beliefs by a single prior. This is the motivation behind
several nonexpected utility models, which have been presented in
the literature in the last two decades.
Among the generalizations of decision making under uncertainty
we would like to refer two types of models: the non-additive probab-
ilities and the multiple priors model. The first type of model was first
introduced by Schmeidler (1982, 1989), but was also axiomatized,
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